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NOTE
Constitutional Law/Alternative Dispute Resolution-SuMMARY JURY
TRIALS: SHOULD THE PUBLIC HAVE AccEss? -Cincinnati Gas &
Electric Co. v. General Electric Co., 854 F.2d 900 (6th Cir. 1988),
cert. denied sub nor. Cincinnati Post v. General Electric Co., 109 S.
Ct. 1171 (1989)
N Cincinnati Gas & Electric Co. v. General Electric Co.,' the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the first amend-
ment did not guarantee the press a right of access to summary jury trial
proceedings. 2 This decision was based upon two conclusions: first, sum-
mary jury trials have not historically been open to the public; and sec-
ond, public access to summary jury trial proceedings would not
significantly further the effectiveness of the process. This Note will dis-
cuss the creation and development of summary jury trials as techniques
for alternative dispute resolution, and will explore the evolution and cur-
rent state of the right of access doctrine. It will also be necessary to ex-
amine the evolution of the right of access doctrine in the criminal
context, since criminal cases served as the foundation for subsequent de-
cisions in the civil context. Finally, the compatibility of the right of ac-
cess doctrine with the policies underlying summary jury trials will be
discussed.
I. THE SUMMARY JURY TRIAL
The summary jury trial was developed in 1980 by the Honorable
Thomas D. Lambros, a judge of the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Ohio.3 While trying two personal injury cases, Judge
Lambros concluded that the parties' failure to settle the cases was a result
1. 854 F.2d 900 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied sub noma. Cincinnati Post v. General Elec.
Co., 109S. Ct. 1171 (1989).
2. Id. at 903.
3. Lambros, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Alternative Methods of Dispute Resolu-
tion, A Report to the Judicial Conference of the United States Committee on the Operation of
the Jury System, 103 F.R.D. 461, 463 (1984) [hereinafter Summary Jury Trial].
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of their disagreement over the potential jury verdict.4 Judge Lambros
pointed out that:
[a]n attorney and his client may feel that a jury's perception of liability
and damages may be more favorable than any settlement that could be
reached in pretrial negotiation. This uncertainty is frequently present in
cases involving a "reasonableness" standard of liability, where no
amount of judicial or legal interpretation of the standard of liability will
assist the parties in resolving the case.'
As a result, Judge Lambros devised his own "crystal ball," drawing by
analogy on the use of advisory juries in federal courts.6
A. Authority
Summary jury trial is a non-binding process designed to aid the parties
in realistically assessing the merits of their cases for the purpose of facili-
tating settlement. 7 The authority to order the parties to a summary jury
trial lies in the court's penumbra of pre-trial powers pursuant to Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 16(a)(1), (5), (c)(7), and (c)(1 1), as well as the
court's inherent power to control its docket.'
4. Id. According to Judge Lambros:
[I]f only the parties could gaze into a crystal ball and be able to predict, with a reason-
able amount of certainty, what a jury would do in their respective cases, the parties
and counsel would be more willing to reach a settlement rather than going through the
expense and aggravation of a full jury trial.
Id. (emphasis in original).
5. Lambros, The Judge's Role in Fostering Voluntary Settlements, 29 VML. L. REv. 1363,
1374 (1983).
6. FED. R. Crv. P. 39(c) provides:
In all actions not triable of right by a jury the court upon motion or its own initiative
may try any issue with an advisory jury or, except in actions against the United States
when a statute of the United States provides for trial without a jury, the court, with
the consent of both parties, may order a trial with a jury whose verdict has the same
effect as if trial by jury had been a matter of right.
7. Lambros, Summary Jury Trials, 37 FE'N IN s. CouNs. Q. 139 (1987).
8. FED. R. Crv. P. 16 provides in part:
(a) PRETRIAL CON'ERENCES; OaECTVES. In any action, the court may in its discretion
direct the attorneys for the parties and any unrepresented parties to appear before it
for a conference or conferences before trial for such purposes as (1) expediting the
disposition of the action .... (5) facilitating the settlement of the case.
Rule 16(c) further provides that "[tlhe participants at any pretrial conference under this rule may
consider and take action with respect to . . . (7) the possibility of settlement or the use of extra-
judicial procedures to resolve the dispute."
Judge Lambros cites the advisory committee note as further support:
Since it obviously eases crowded court dockets and results in savings to the litigants
and the judicial system, settlement should be facilitated at as early a stage of the litiga-
tion as possible. Although it is not the purpose of Rule 16[c](7) to impose settlement
SUMMAR Y JURY TRIALS
This authority has recently been challenged in at least three federal
cases. In Strandell v. Jackson County,9 the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit held that the federal district court lacked the authority to
order the parties to participate in summary jury trial. 10 This reasoning,
however, was not followed in Florida. In Arabian American Oil v. Scar-
fone," the District Court for the Middle District of Florida explicitly re-
jected the reasoning of the Seventh Circuit and held that the court may
order the parties to summary jury trial.12 According to the court, "[t]he
obvious purpose and aim of Rule 16 is to allow courts the discretion and
processes necessary for intelligent and effective case management and
disposition. Whatever name the judge may give to these proceedings their
purposes are the same and are sanctioned by Rule 16."'1 The Eastern
District of Kentucky also recently declined to follow Strandell, and up-
held the discretion of the trial judge to order the litigants to participate in
summary jury trial. 14 In McKay v. Ashland Oil, the court rejected the
opinion of the Seventh Circuit regarding Rule 16 and the court's inherent
authority to manage its docket. 5 Instead, the court read Rule 16 broadly
and noted that, "Itihe belief of the Judicial Conference that mandatory
summary jury trials were authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure seems apparent." ' 16 Other jurisdictions have adopted local rules for
negotiations on unwilling litigants, it is believed that providing a neutral forum for
discussing the subject might foster it. . . . For instance, a judge to whom a case has
been assigned may arrange, on his own motion or at a party's request, to have settle-
ment conferences handled by another member of the court or by a magistrate.
Lambros, supra note 5, at 1375 (citation omitted) (quoting FED. R. Cry. P. 16 advisory commit-
tee's note).
9. 838 F.2d 884 (7th Cir. 1987).
10. Id. at 887.
11. 119 F.R.D. 448 (M.D. Fla. 1988).
12. Id. at 449.
13. Id. at 448.
14. McKay v. Ashland Oil, 120 F.R.D. 43 (E.D. Ky. 1988).
15. Id. at 48-49. See also Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 117 F.R.D. 597,
599 (S.D. Ohio 1987), aff'd, 854 F. 2d 900 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied sub nom. Cincinnati Post
v. General Elec. Co., 109 S. Ct. 1171 (1989) ("We believe that the Court has the power to
conduct summary jury trials either under Rule 16, Fed. R. Civ. P., or as a matter of the Court's
inherent power to manage its own cases.").
16. McKay, 120 F.R.D. at 48. For a more detailed discussion of whether Rule 16 sanctions
summary jury trial, see Maatman, The Future of Summary Jury Trials in Federal Courts: Stran-
dell v. Jackson County, 21 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 455 (1988); Posner, The Summary Jury Trial
and Other Methods of Alternative Dispute Resolution: Some Cautionary Observations, 53 U.
Cm. L. REV. 366, 385 (1986) (asserting that federal judges lack authority under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure to mandate summary jury trial participation).
Two proposed bills would expand the current authority of federal courts to employ alterna-
tive dispute resolution. Representative William J. Hughes, Dem., New Jersey, has introduced a
bill in the House of Representatives which would amend part VI of title 28, United States Code,
adding a new chapter on alternative dispute resolution. See H.R. 473, 100th Cong., 1st Sess.,
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the use of summary jury trials. 17 For purposes of this Note, judicial au-
thority to mandate summary jury trials will be assumed.
B. The Process
Judge Lambros strongly recommends that only those cases which are
substantially prepared for trial should be ordered to summary jury trial.
Otherwise, the jury assessment may lack reliability.,8
Before a case is assigned to summary jury trial, a pretrial conference is
held, at which time the court hears any motions in limine, and rules on
potential objections.19 A few days before summary jury trial, the parties
submit trial briefs and proposed jury instructions. 20 Potential jurors are
selected, given a description of the case, and asked to complete a brief
juror profile questionnaire. 21 A short voir dire is then conducted, during
which counsel is limited to two preemptory challenges.Y Because the pur-
pose of summary jury trial is to afford each party a realistic evaluation
of the merits of its case, individual clients are required to attend.23 Cor-
porate clients must be represented by a top echelon officer or someone
with decision-making authority.' Unless the judge specifically orders or
all the parties expressly desire, the proceedings are neither open to the
public, nor are they usually recorded.21
Each side is permitted to briefly present its case, and no live testimony
is permitted.2 The attorneys present all the evidence and may incorporate
legal arguments in the evidentiary presentations.27 Opening and closing
133 CONG. REc. H145-06 (1987). A senate bill, proposed by Senator Mitch McConnell, Repub.,
Kentucky, would amend Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 16 and 68 to expand the use of alter-
native dispute resolution. See S. 554, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
17. See Lambros, supra note 5, at 1373 n.38; Levin & Golash, Alternative Dispute Resolu-
tion in Federal District Courts, 37 U. FLA. L. REV. 29, 39 (1985).
18. Summary Jury Trial, supra note 3, at 470. For examples of cases where Judge Lambros
has ordered summary jury trial, see Negin v. Mentor, 601 F. Supp. 1502 (N.D. Ohio 1985);
Rocco Wine Distrib. v. Pleasant Valley Wine, 596 F. Supp. 617 (N.D. Ohio 1984); see also
Muehler v. Land O'Lakes, Inc., 617 F. Supp. 1370 (D. Minn. 1985).
19. Summary Jury Trial, supra note 3, at 470.
20. Id.
21. For a sample juror profile questionnaire, see Lambros & Shunk, The Summary Jury
Trial, 29 Cuv. ST. L. REv. 43, 47 (1980).
22. Id. at 48. Voir dire typically consists of a simple "show of hands" to questions which
might elicit answers indicating potential bias. The procedure generally takes no longer than fif-
teen minutes.
23. Spiegel, Summary Jury Trials, 54 U. CiN. L. REv. 829, 830 (1986).
24. Id. at 830-31.
25. Summary Jury Trial, supra note 3, at 471.
26. Id. Some judges have adopted variations of Lambros' model and one judge has even
allowed live witness testimony. Levin & Golash, Alternative Dispute Resolution in Federal Dis-
trict Courts, 37 U. FLA. L. REV. 29, 38 (1985).
27. Summary Jury Trial, supra note 3, at 471.
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arguments are combined into a narration of what would be presented at
trial. The respective attorneys are each allotted one hour, which may be
divided to reserve time for rebuttal.29 Formal objections may be enter-
tained, but they are not encouraged. 0 Evidentiary rules are few and flexi-
ble, and evidence is restricted to what may be admissible at trial."
Although attorneys are permitted to read from statements, reports, and
depositions, they are not encouraged to do so extensively. After the par-
ties present their case, the judge charges the jury with an abbreviated
instruction, and the jury retires to deliberate.32 Although the jury is en-
couraged to reach a consensus verdict, it may return individual verdicts
listing each juror's opinion of liability and damages.3 Summary jury trial
participants may stipulate that any consensus verdict will be considered a
final determination on the merits entered as the judgment of the court. 34
In addition, "counsel may stipulate to any other use of the verdict that
will aid in resolution of the case." 35 Once the court has received the ver-
dict(s), the judge, jurors and parties discuss the proceeding and the ver-
dict(s). 36 This discussion is unique to summary jury trials and often forms
the basis for settlement negotiations, since it is at this point that the par-
ties begin to fully understand the strengths and weaknesses of their re-
spective cases.37
Lambros and other authorities emphasize the non-binding nature of
the summary jury trial proceeding. It is viewed solely as a technique for
facilitating settlement.3" Thus, neither the jury findings nor any statement
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. Usually, these objections are dealt with at the pre-summary jury trial conference.
The purpose is to make the presentation as concise as possible in order to preserve its efficient
nature.
31. Id. ("Representations of facts must be supportable by reference to discovery materials,
including depositions, stipulations, documents, and formal admissions, or by a professional rep-
resentation that counsel has spoken with the witness and is repeating that which the witness
stated"). For a detailed analysis of court's limitations, see Lambros & Shunk, supra note 21, at
49-50.
32. Id.
33. Id. A sample advisory verdict form appears in Lambros & Shunk, supra note 21, at 57.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Lambros, supra note 7, at 146.
37. Id.
38. Summary Jury Trial, supra note 3, at 469. Judge Lambros has observed:
The [summary jury trial] is designed to provide a 'no-risk' method by which the par-
ties may obtain the perception of six jurors on the merits of their case without a large
investment of time or money. The proceeding is not binding and in no way affects the
parties' rights to a full trial on the merits. SJT is a predictive tool that counsel may use
to achieve a just result for their client at minimum expense.
Id. (emphasis added). See also Spiegel, supra note 23, at 833.
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by counsel made during the summary jury trial are admissible in a future
trial on the merits.39 Nor can they be construed as judicial admissions.""
C. The Results
Although the procedure has been in existence for only eight years, the
use of summary jury trials has grown dramatically. An estimated sixty-
five federal district courts have conducted summary jury trials. 41 The
proponents praise the device as resulting in dramatic cost-savings and
higher settlement rates. Summary jury trials are effective because they
simulate an actual trial, and it is the reaction of the jurors which prompts
the parties to settle." The summary jury trial advisory verdict enables
both attorneys to assess how an actual jury would evaluate their case. 43
Because they are required to attend, the clients also have the opportunity
to assess the strength of the opposing side's case." Finally, the process
enables the clients to have their "day in court," thus providing an emo-
tional outlet. 5
There is still some controversy as to the effectiveness of the device, as
well as its legality.46 In "the eyes of some, these techniques run counter
to the American justice system's concept of ventilation, confrontation,
and vindication of rights in a structured adversarial system." 7
39. Spiegel, supra note 23, at 831.
40. Id.
41. Maatman, supra note 16, at 457. See also Note, Practice and Potential of the Advisory
Jury, 100 HhAv. L. REV. 1363, 1368 (1987) ("More than two hundred summary jury proceedings
have been conducted so far in six different states, with 'overwhelming success' in facilitating
settlement.').
42. Marcotte, Summary Jury Trials Touted, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1, 1987, at 27. However, this
is not to suggest that summary jury trials must be virtually identical to actual trials on the merits
in order to be effective. Lambros notes that many attorneys' objections to the procedure:
reflect the misconception that to be effective the summary jury trial has to be as simi-
lar to a trial on the merits as possible. It would be impossible to simulate fully an
evidentiary trial in the course of a half-day proceeding. That is why some aspects of
the evidentiary trial were purposely altered to provide a more speedy proceeding.
Lambros & Shunk, supra note 21, at 53.
43. Ranii, Summary Jury Trials Gain Favor, NAT'L L.J., June 10, 1985, at 1, col. 2.
44. Id.
45. Id. See also Spiegel, supra note 23, at 833. Spiegel points out that the summary jury
trial is unique among alternative dispute resolution techniques, such as mediation and concilia-
tion, because "[n]one of these methods provides the parties with their day in court where they
can air their grievances." Id.
46. See Posner, supra note 16, at 385-86. See also notes 9-15, supra, and accompanying
text.
47. Spiegel, supra note 23, at 833. But see Williams, Speedier Justice: Summary Trials Help
Courts to Hasten Settlements, Wall St. J., Dec. 1, 1986, at 25, col. I (citing examples of sum-
mary jury trials and reasons for their success).
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II. A RIGHT OF ACCESS?
The recognition of a constitutional right of access to judicial proceed-
ings is of relatively recent origin. Until recently, courts which recognized
a public right of access based their decisions on common law rather than
on constitutional grounds.4 As one commentator noted, "[a]lthough the
open courtroom is a pervasive feature of the Anglo-American judicial
system, trial courts in the last decade have frequently restricted public
access by holding portions of their proceedings in secret or by placing
restraints on the dissemination of information by the press or partici-
pants." 49 However, since the landmark case of Richmond Newspapers v.
Virginia:° in which the United States Supreme Court recognized a quali-
fied right of access to criminal trials, the access doctrine has developed
significantly. In order to discuss the constitutional right of access to civil
trials, it is first necessary to focus on the doctrine in the criminal context,
because it was from this context that the civil doctrine evolved.
A. Right of Access in Criminal Trials
In Gannett Co. v. DePasquale,11 the Supreme Court held that the clo-
sure of a suppression hearing, at the request of the defendant, violated
neither the first nor the sixth amendments.52 First, the Court rejected the
argument that since the sixth amendment guaranteed the defendant the
right to an open trial," there should be a "correlative right in members
of the public to insist upon a public trial." ' The petitioners also argued
that the first and fourteenth amendments guaranteed the press and the
public the right of access to pretrial hearings.5 Although the Court ex-
pressly declined to decide whether such a right existed, 6 it assumed such
a right for the purpose of review.17 The Court held that even if such a
48. See, e.g., Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947) ("[wlhat transpires in the court
room [sic] is public property").
49. Note, Trial Secrecy and the First Amendment Right of Public Access to Judicial Pro-
ceedings, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1899 (1978) (footnotes omitted).
50. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
51. 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
52. Id. at 394.
53. The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "In all criminal pro-
secutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial .... "
54. Gannett, 443 U.S. at 381. But see Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984) (when the
government moves to close the suppression hearing over the defendant's objection, several con-
ditions must be met to avoid violating the defendant's sixth amendment rights).
55. Gannett, 443 U.S. at 391.
56. Id. at 392. "[Whether] the First and Fourteenth Amendments may guarantee such ac-
cess in some situations, [is] a question we do not decide . Id.
57. Id.
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right existed, it was not violated when the trial court balanced the consti-
tutional right of access against the defendant's right to a fair trial. 8
Only one year later, in Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia,9 the Court
addressed the issue of whether the press and public have a constitutional
right of access to a criminal trial. The Court reviewed the history of
openness in Anglo-American criminal trials, and noted that "one of the
most conspicuous features of English justice, that all judicial trials are
held in open court, to which the public have free access.... appears to
have been the rule in England from time immemorial."' 0 Public access
was historically justified because openness increases the likelihood of a
fairly conducted proceeding, discourages perjury and participant miscon-
duct, and lessens the likelihood of a biased decision.6 ' Persuaded by his-
tory, the Court held that the Constitution guarantees the press and the
public the right of access to criminal trials.62 Applying a strict scrutiny
standard, the Court qualified the holding by noting that the right of ac-
cess is not absolute, and could be modified by reasonable time, place,
and manner restrictions.63 However, absent an overriding interest articu-
lated by the trial court, the Court held that a criminal trial must be open
to the public.M
Probably the most crucial opinion in Richmond Newspapers is Justice
Brennan's concurrence. 65 While Justice Brennan wholeheartedly endorsed
the notion of a constitutional right of access, he proceeded to more
clearly define the applicable test. 6 First, Brennan concluded that the ar-
gument in favor of a right of access was much stronger "when drawn
from an enduring and vital tradition of public entree to particular pro-
ceedings or information." 67 Second, he stated that, "what is crucial in
58. Id. at 393. The Court also noted that it was significant in this case that the denial of
access was only temporary, and that "[u]nlike the case of an absolute ban on access, therefore,
the press here had the opportunity to inform the public of the details of the pretrial hearing
accurately and completely." Id.
Although the majority did not address the issue of a right of access, Justice Powell, in his
concurring opinion, endorsed the notion of a constitutional right of access. Id. at 397 (Powell,
J., concurring). Justice Powell concluded, however, that given the agreement of both parties and
the unique situation involved, the trial court did not abuse its discretion. Id. at 403.
59. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
60. Id. at 566-67 (quoting E. JENKS, THE BOOK ON ENGLISH LAw 73-74 (6th ed. 1967)).
61. Id. at 569.
62. Id. at 580.
63. Id. at 581 n. 18. Seven of the Justices recognized a right of access in the first and four-
teenth amendments.
64. Id. at 580-81. The Court distinguished Gannett by noting that it involved access to pre-
trial hearings, not trials.
65. Id. at 584 (Brennan, J., concurring).
66. Id. at 589.
67. Id. (citation omitted).
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individual cases is whether access to a particular government process is
important in terms of that very process.' "6
This two-prong test was subsequently adopted in other right of access
cases. In Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court,69 the Court applied
Justice Brennan's two-prong test to strike down a statute excluding the
public and press from criminal trials during the testimony of child rape
victims. The Court noted that criminal trials have traditionally been open
to the public, thus satisfying the first prong. 70 It then stated that "the
right of access to criminal trials plays a particularly significant role in the
functioning of the judicial process and the government as a whole."' 7'
Applying a strict scrutiny test, the Court held that the asserted state inter-
ests, although compelling, could be effectuated by less restrictive meas-
ures than mandatory closure. 72
In Press-Enterprise v. Superior Courf3 (Press-Enterprise 1), the Court
vacated a trial court order excluding the public and press from the voir
dire proceedings in the criminal trial of a defendant charged with the
rape and murder of a young girl.74 Applying the two-prong test, the
Court reviewed the history of the jury selection process and noted that
the process had traditionally been open to the public. 75 The Court further
concluded that openness served to further the effectiveness of proceed-
ings by enhancing the public's confidence in the basic fairness of the
criminal trial, as well as by providing a "community therapeutic
value." 76 The Court then concluded that the state's interests77 were un-
supported by the trial court's findings, and could be effectuated through
alternative, less drastic measures.
68. Id.
69. 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
70. Id. at 605.
71. Id. at 606.
72. Id. at 610. The state interests asserted in support of the mandatory closure statute were
"the protection of minor victims of sex crimes from further trauma and embarrassment" and
"the encouragement of such victims to come forward and testify in a truthful and credible man-
ner." Id. at 607.
73. 464 U.S. 501 (1984).
74. Id. at 503.
75. Id. at 507 (citation omitted).
76. Id. at 508.
When the public is aware that the law is being enforced and the criminal justice system
is functioning, an outlet is provided for these understandable reactions and emotions.
Proceedings held in secret would deny this outlet and frustrate the broad public inter-
est; by contrast, public proceedings vindicate the concerns of the victims and the com-
munity in knowing that offenders are being brought to account for their criminal
conduct by jurors fairly and openly selected.
Id. at 509 (citations omitted).
77. The state's asserted interests, which the lower court upheld, were the protection of the
criminal defendant's right to a fair trial and the prospective juror's right to privacy.
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Finally, in Press-Enterprise v. Superior Courf8 (Press Enterprise I]),
the Court applied Justice Brennan's two-prong test to hold that a quali-
fied first amendment right of access attached to criminal preliminary
hearings.79 First, the Court held that the "tradition of accessibility" re-
quirement had been met, reasoning that: "Although grand jury proceed-
ings have traditionally been closed to the public and the accused,
preliminary hearings conducted before neutral and detached magistrates
have been open to the public."8° The Court further concluded that public
access to preliminary hearings satisfied the "function" requirement. 8
The Court noted that "the preliminary hearing in many cases provides
'the sole occasion for public observation of the criminal justice
system '82 because it is often the final and most important phase of a
criminal proceeding. In addition, the Court indicated that the absence of
a jury to safeguard the defendant's interests made public access even
more important.83 Finally, the Court held that a denial of access would
frustrate the "community therapeutic value" of openness.8 4 Because the
first amendment right of access did attach to the preliminary hearings,
the Court concluded that the automatic closure of the hearings was not
sufficiently tailored to the governmental interest of reducing the risk of
prejudice so as to justify abridging first amendment rights.85
B. Right of Access in Civil Trials
The Supreme Court has never expressly recognized whether a right of
access attaches in civil proceedings.86 There is however, persuasive dicta
suggesting that the Court would extend the Richmond Newspapers ra-
tionale to civil cases.Y Persuaded by this dicta, a number of state and
federal courts have found a right of access in various contexts.
78. 478 U.S. 1 (1986).
79. Id. at 10.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 11-12.
82. Id. at 12 (citation omitted) (quoting San Jose Mercury-News v. Municipal Court, 30
Cal. 3d 498, 511, 638 P.2d 655, 663, 179 Cal. Rptr. 772, 780 (1982)).
83. Id. at 12-13.
84. Id. at 13 (quoting Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 570 (1980)).
85. Id. at 15.
86. See Note, What Ever Happened to "The Right to Know"?: Access to Government-
Controlled Information Since Richmond Newspapers, 73 VA. L. REv. 1111, 1112 (1987).
87. See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 n.17 ("Whether the
public has a right to attend trials of civil cases is a question not raised by this case, but we note
that historically both civil and criminal trials have been presumptively open"). See also id. at 590
(Brennan, J., concurring) ("[I]t appears that 'there is little record, if any, of secret proceedings,
criminal or civil, having occurred at any time in known English history') (quoting Gannett Co.
v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 420 (1979) (Blackmun J., concurring and dissenting)); id. at 596
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1. The Two-Prong Test
The lower courts differ in their approaches to the right of access issue.
Some courts have adopted Justice Brennan's two-prong test, and, once
the test is satisfied, apply a strict scrutiny test.88 In Brown & Williamson
Tobacco v. Federal Trade Commision,89 the court of appeals vacated a
district court order sealing various documents, despite the existence of a
confidentiality agreement between the parties. 90 The court applied the
two-prong test and found that "[tihe Supreme Court's analysis of the
justifications for access to the criminal courtroom apply as well to the
civil trial." 9' The court noted that the resolution of civil disputes often
effects third parties or the general public, and concluded that the com-
munity catharsis value was necessary in civil as well as in criminal cases. 92
The court further stated that civil cases often expose crucial public issues
and expressed the concern that secrecy eliminates an important check on
the integrity of the system. 93 Finally, the court noted that fact-finding
considerations, such as discouraging perjury and encouraging witnesses
to come forward, apply as well in the civil context. Applying a strict
scrutiny standard, the court noted that common law exceptions to the
right of access had been developed to protect competing interests, such as
"privacy rights of participants or third parties, trade secrets and national
security. '"94 However, the court qualified these exceptions: "Simply
showing that the information would harm the company's reputation is
not sufficient to overcome the strong common law presumption in favor
of public access to court proceedings and records. ' ' 9" The court held that
the public interest in having access to information which involves the
health of citizens outweighed the parties' interest in keeping such infor-
mation confidential.9
(Brennan, J., concurring) ("Also, mistakes of facts in civil litigation may inflict costs upon oth-
ers than the plaintiff and defendant. Facilitation of the trial fact-finding process, therefore, is of
concern to the public as well as to the parties"); id. at 599 (Stewart, J., concurring) ("[T]he First
and Fourteenth Amendments clearly give the press and the public a right of access to the trials
themselves, civil as well as criminal").
88. See, e.g., Middleton, Should a Court Keep Secrets?, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 17, 1988, at 1,
col. 4. "Although the high court has yet to broaden First Amendment access rights to include
civil proceedings, lower courts increasingly are performing delicate balancing acts-based on
constitutional, common law or statutory grounds-between the public's right to know and a
litigant's right to privacy." Id.
89. 710 F.2d 1165 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 110 (1984).
90. Id. at 1181.
91. Id. at 1178.




96. Id. at 1180.
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In another case, Publicker Industries v. "Cohen,9 the Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit held that the first amendment secures to the public
and press a right of access to civil proceedings. 9s In Publicker, the trial
court closed a preliminary hearing, the purpose of which was to decide
whether the defendant was obligated to reveal certain information to its
corporate shareholders. The court of appeals held that the trial court had
abused its discretion by failing to articulate countervailing interests or
specific findings sufficient to overcome the presumption of openness in
the hearing. 99 In addressing the issue of a first amendment right of ac-
cess, the court noted that the common law right of access to judicial
proceedings had generally been considered by the Supreme Court in con-
junction with criminal proceedings.'°0 However, the court relied upon Su-
preme Court dicta in Gannett to hold that the public has a common law
right of access to civil proceedings as well as criminal. 0'
The court found it more difficult to decide whether a first
amendment right existed. The court referred to the two-prong test
enunciated in Globe Newspaper,10 2 and concluded that a review of
English and American legal authorities was necessary to determine
whether a presumption of openness adheres in the civil context as
well. 0 The court cited various English authorities, such as Sir Ed-
ward Coke, 0 4 Sir Matthew Hale, 05 and William Blackstone 10 6 for
97. 733 F.2d 1059 (3d Cir. 1984).
98. Id. at 1061.
99. Id. at 1072.
100. Id. at 1066.
101. The court stated:
For many centuries, both civil and criminal trials have traditionally been open to the
public. As early as 1685, Sir John Hawkes commented that open proceedings were
necessary so 'that truth may be discovered in civil as well as criminal matters.'...
English commentators also assumed that the common-law rule was that the public
could attend civil and criminal trials without distinguishing between the two.
Id. at 1067 (citations omitted) (quoting Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 386 n.15
(1979)).
102. Id. at 1068.
103. Id.
104. "These words [In curia Domini Regis] are of great importance, for all Causes ought to
be heard, ordered, and determined before the Judges of the King's Court openly in the King's
Courts, whither all persons may resort .. " Id. (emphasis added) (quoting 2 E. COKE, INSn-
TUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 103 (6th ed. 1681)).
105. Hale stated:
The Excellency of this open Course of Evidence to the Jury in Presence of the Judge,
Jury, Parties and Council, and even of the adverse Witnesses, appears in these Partic-
ulars: 1st, That it is openly; and not private before a Commissioner or Two, and a
couple of Clerks, where oftentimes Witnesses will deliver that which they will be
ashamed to testify publicly.
Id. (quoting M. HALE, HISTORY TO COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND 163 (C. Gray ed. 1972)).
106. Blackstone stated that:
Th[is] open examination of witnesses viva voce, in the presence of all mankind, is
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the proposition that there should be no distinction between civil
and criminal trials with respect to the presumption of openness. 10 7
The court then pointed out that this English common law right of
access had been transferred to the American colonies and con-
cluded that, "Itihe explanation for and importance of this public
right of access to civil trials is that it is inherent in the nature of
our democratic form of government."'10 8
The court concluded that multiple justifications support access to
civil and criminal proceedings.' 9 Access enhances and safeguards the
integrity of the fact-finding process; it promotes an appearance of
fairness, and enhances public respect for the judicial system. In addi-
tion, access permits the public to participate in and act as a check on
the judicial process and thus plays an important role in the participa-
tion and free discussion of governmental affairs. However, the court
conceded that the first amendment right was not absolute and could
be outweighed by an important governmental interest when there is no
less restrictive way of serving that interest. 110 The court also cited vari-
ous exceptions to the presumption of openness, such as a party's in-
terest in confidential commercial information, and trade secrets, the
disclosure of which could cause irreparable harm."' The court pro-
ceeded to hold that "[b]ecause the district court failed to articulate
overriding interests based on specific findings . . . and because the
district court failed to consider less restrictive means to keep this in-
formation from the public," the district court had abused its discre-
tion in closing the hearing."12
much more conducive to the clearing up of truth, than the private and secret examina-
tion taken down in writing before an officer, or his clerk, in the ecclesiastical courts,
and all others that have borrowed their practice from the civil law, where a witness
may frequently depose that in private which he will be ashamed to testify in a public
and solemn tribunal.
Id. at 1068-69 (quoting 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES (1941)).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1069. The Court went on to quote Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes:
It is desirable that the trial of [civil] causes should take place under the public eye...
not because the controversies of one citizen with another are of public concern, but
because it is of the highest moment that those who administer justice should always
act under the sense of public responsibility, and that every citizen should be able to
satisfy himself with his own eyes as to the mode in which a public duty is performed.
Id. (quoting Cowley v. Pulsifer, 137 Mass. 392, 394 (1884)).
109. Id. at 1070.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 1071. See infra notes 141-44 and accompanying text.
112. Id. at 1074. In weighing the respective interests at issue, the court observed, "[Tlhe
presumption of openness plus the policy interest in protecting unsuspecting people from invest-
ing in Publicker in light of its bad business practices are not overcome by the proprietary interest
of present stockholders in not losing stock value or the interest of upper-level management in
escaping embarrassment." Id.
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2. The Common Law's "Balancing Test"
Some courts continue to apply a common law approach of balanc-
ing the public's interest in obtaining information against the govern-
ment's interest in refusing to disclose it."' Other courts have simply
incorporated Justice Brennan's two-prong test into their balancing
analysis, treating the two components as two additional factors to be
considered.11 4 For example, in Mokhiber v. Davis,"5 the Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia found a presumptive public right of
access to pretrial records in civil litigation, based upon common law
considerations." 6 This case involved a reporter who asserted a right to
view, inter alia, certain motions filed in connection with the discovery
process." 7 In holding that the reporter had a presumptive right of ac-
cess to these documents, the court carefully distinguished between the
filed and unfiled materials: "By submitting pleadings and motions to
the court for decision, one enters the public arena of courtroom pro-
ceedings and exposes oneself, as well as the opposing party, to the
risk, though by no means the certainty, of public scrutiny.""'  While
the court observed that there was no tradition of access to discovery
hearings and pleadings submitted in connection therewith, it refused
to adopt a restrictive approach and discounted the importance of this
factor." 9 Instead, the court focused on the importance of the discov-
ery process in civil litigation and concluded that the public interest in
such documents remained strong, even though in this case, the mo-
tions were never ruled upon because the parties settled. 20 The court
cited three reasons for this conclusion: first, the presumptive right of
access attaches when the pleadings are filed with the court; ' 2 second,
the court often plays an active role in the process leading to settle-
ment; and third, the court may ratify a resulting agreement, and this
decision may be viewed in light of available information, such as the
pleadings. 12 2 Thus, with regard to filed pleadings, the court engaged in
113. See generally Note, supra note 86, at 1126.
114. Id. at 1123-26.
115. 537 A.2d 1100 (D.C. 1988).
116. Id. at 1108.
117. Id. at 1111.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1112. The court concluded, "In short, we do not view the common law right of
access as one frozen in history but rather as one that, in the finest tradition of our jurisprudence,
must reflect changes brought by the times." Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. Accord Atlanta Journal v. Long, 258 Ga. 410, 369 S.E.2d 755 (1988) (presumptive
right of access to court documents includes prejudgment records in civil cases and begins when
judicial document is filed).
122. Mokhiber, 537 A.2dat 1112-13.
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a common law analysis which included Brennan's two-prong test as
additional, but not dispositive, factors to be considered.
The court, however, declined to extend this right to pretrial deposi-
tions, interrogatories, and documents gained through discovery. 23 Al-
though expressly resting its decision on common law considerations, 124
the court engaged in a first amendment analysis, concluding that no
public right of access attaches to unfiled discovery materials. Citing
various authorities, including the recent Supreme Court decision in
Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 125 the court noted that no other court
had extended the presumptive right of access to pretrial depositions,
interrogatories, and documents obtained through discovery.126 In ex-
amining the underlying rationales for the lack of a public right of ac-
cess, the court further noted that these discovery materials were not
traditionally open to the public. 27 The court found that not only
would access to these proceedings fail to enhance the functioning of
the judicial process, it would even have a deleterious effect:
Because discovery typically requires the parties to produce
information ultimately irrelevant to the suit and inadmissible at trial,
a presumptive right of access by members of the public at large
would create a greater burden on the privacy of litigants than does
the publicity attending motions and trials. The threat of publicity
about discovered information would pressure parties to fight
disclosure more vigorously and would probably influence the courts
supervising discovery to narrow the parties' access to information,
thus vitiating the basic policy of liberal discovery. 28
The court discussed the differences between viewing the right of access
as a common law right, as opposed to a constitutional right. "The
123. Id. at 1109; accord In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 96 F.R.D. 582, 584
(E.D.N.Y. 1983) ("[Tlhere is no independent right of access by non-parties to materials pro-
duced in discovery and not made part of the public record."); Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 805
F.2d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 1986).
124. Mokhiber, 537 A.2d at 1108. The court stated: "In sum, we feel constrained to follow
precedent from the Supreme Court and this jurisdiction in resting a presumptive public right of
access to pretrial court records in civil litigation on common law considerations." Id. (footnote
omitted).
125. 467 U.S. 20 (1984).
126. Mokhiber, 537 A.2d at 1109. "[Tjhe public has no common law or constitutional right
of access to discovery materials as such, that is, to discovery materials that neither side has
introduced as evidence at trial or as documentation in support of trial papers or motions to the
court." Id.
127. Id.at 1110.
128. Id. at I11.
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major difference . . . appears to be that a common law right is more
easily overcome by reasons favoring secrecy."' 129
C. Trends
Although it is difficult to discover any rigid classification of when
information is or is not accessible, certain trends have become appar-
ent among the lower courts.
1. Timing
One trend among lower courts is to distinguish between pretrial
proceedings and trial proceedings. The presumption of openness in
pretrial proceedings appears to be somewhat diluted, at least when
such proceedings do not implicate the integrity of the fact-finding
process. For example, some courts have denied access to deposi-
tions, 130 interrogatories,' unfiled discovery materials, 132 and prelimi-
nary hearings. 33
2. Settlement
Another generally recognized exception to the presumed right of ac-
cess involves settlement proceedings. In Palmieri v. New York,,34 the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit noted that "[s]ecrecy of set-
tlement terms. . . is a well-established American litigation prac-
tice."' 35  In Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Schumacher,3 6 the
129. Id. at 1108. The court went on to say: "In most cases, there may be little difference
between a common law and constitutional right of access. Both ensure a presumption of access
and permit a court to bar disclosure only when the specific interests favoring secrecy outweigh
the general and specific interests favoring disclosure." Id.
130. Lewis R. Pyle Memorial Hosp. v. Superior Court, 149 Ariz. 193, 717 P.2d 872 (1986).
131. Mokhiber v. Davis, 537 A.2d 1100 (D.C. 1988).
132. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Gridley, 510 So. 2d 884 (Fla. 1987). See also Seattle
Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20 (1984) (upholding the constitutionality of a protective order
against dissemination of discovered information). The Court in Rhinehart stated:
Moreover, pre-trial depositions and interrogatories are not public components of a
civil trial. Such proceedings were not open to the public at common law, and, in gen-
eral, they are conducted in private as a matter of modem practice. . . . Much of the
information that surfaces during pretrial discovery may be unrelated, or only tangen-
tially related, to the underlying cause of action. Therefore, restraints placed on discov-
ered, but not yet admitted, information are not a restriction on a traditionally public
source of information.
Id. at 33 (citations and footnotes omitted). See also notes 117-28, supra, and accompanying text.
133. In re Midland Publishing Co., 420 Mich. 148, 362 N.W.2d 580 (1984).
134. 779 F.2d 861 (2d Cir. 1985).
135. Id. at 865 (quoting In re Franklin Nat'l Bank Sec. Litig., 92 F.R.D. 468, 472 (E.D.N.Y.
1981), aff'd sub nom. FDIC v. Ernst & Ernst, 677 F.2d 230 (2d Cir. 1982)).
136. 392 N.W.2d 197 (Minn. 1986).
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Minnesota Supreme Court held that "no first amendment right of ac-
cess exists in the settlement documents and transcripts sealed by the
court.'1 7 The court noted that historically, most settlements have
been private and the involvement of a court is limited to accepting a
stipulated agreement and dismissing a claim once notified that the
parties have agreed to settle.'38 The court's perception of the historic
privacy of settlement agreements was found to be supported by the
fact that settlements, offers to settle, and settlement negotiations are
all inadmissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence to prove liabil-
ity.'39 The court reasoned that it would be inconsistent with public
policy encouraging settlement to make settlement documents public.140
3. Confidential Trade Secrets and National Security
Judicial records involving trade secrets and national security are all
generally recognized as exceptions to the preemptive right of access. 41
These exceptions were carved out by courts to protect the competing
privacy interests of the litigants. 42 However, two limitations on the
trade secret exception must be noted. The court in Brown & William-
son Tobacco stated that "[s]imply showing that the information
would harm the company's reputation is not sufficient to overcome
the strong common law presumption in favor of public access to court
proceedings and records."'' 43 The court also noted that the desire to
137. Id. at 204. But see Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust and Say. Ass'n v. Hotel Rittenhouse As-
socs., 800 F.2d 339, 346 (3d Cir. 1986) ("Even if we were to assume that some settlements would
not be effectuated if their confidentiality was not assured, the generalized interest in encouraging
settlements does not rise to the level of interests that we have recognized may outweigh the
public's common law right of access.").
138. Minneapolis Star & Tribune, 392 N.W.2d at 204. See, e.g., Times Herald Printing Co.
y. Jones, 717 S.W.2d 933 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986) (trial court did not abuse its discretion by sealing
orders, opinions, and nondiscovery pleadings in compliance with parties' request that was condi-
tion of settlement).
139. FED. R. EVID. 408.
140. Minneapolis Star & Tribune, 392 N.W.2d at 204-05.
141. See, e.g., Nixon v. Warner Communications, 435 U.S. 589 (1978); Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 710 F.2d 1165 (6th Cir. 1983).
142. Brown & Williamson Tobacco, 710 F.2d at 1179; accord Mokhiber v. Davis, 537 A.2d
1100, 1115 (D.C. 1988); See also In re NBC, 653 F.2d 609, 613 (D.C. Cir. 1981). Thus, the
public may be:
excluded, temporarily or permanently, from court proceedings or the records of court
proceedings to protect private as well as public interests: to protect trade secrets, or
the privacy and reputation of victims of crimes, as well as to guard against risks to
national security interests, and to minimize the danger of an unfair trial by adverse
publicity.
Id.
143. Brown & Williamson Tobacco, 710 F.2d at 1179; accord Wilson v. American Motors
Corp., 759 F.2d 1568 (11th Cir. 1985); State v. Cottman Transmission Sys., 75 Md. App. 647,
542 A.2d 859 (Ct. Spec. App. 1988).
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shield prejudicial records could not be accommodated without "seri-
ously undermining the tradition of an open judicial system."'" The
court continued:
Indeed, common sense tells us that the greater the motivation a
corporation has to shield its operations, the greater the public's need
to know. In such cases, a court should not seal records unless public
access would reveal legitimate trade secrets, a recognized exception
to the right of public access to judicial records. 145
Finally, the court stressed that a confidentiality agreement between lit-
igating parties does not bind a court in any way.'"4
4. Divorce Proceedings
Some courts have permitted the closure of divorce proceedings to
the public. For example, in Katz v. Katz, 47 the court reversed an or-
der opening to the public divorce hearings pertaining to equitable dis-
tribution of marital property. 48 Conceding the existence of a
presumptive public right of access to civil trials, the court noted that
this right was not absolute. 49 The court found that "a party seeking
closure has the burden of showing that the proceedings will involve
material of the type which courts will protect and that there is good
cause for closure."' 150 Good cause is established "on a showing that
disclosure will work a clearly defined and serious injury to the party
seeking closure."'' The court concluded that good cause for closure
144. Brown & Williamson Tobacco, 710F.2d at 1180.
145. Id.
146. Id; accord Times Herald Printing Co. v. Jones, 717 S.W.2d 933 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986).
147. 356 Pa. Super. 461, 514 A.2d 1374 (1986).
148. Id. at 462, 512 A.2d at 1375.
149. Id. at 465, 514 'A.2d at 1377. For a case involving a long-closed domestic relations case,
see Sentinel Communications Co. v. Smith, 493 So. 2d 1048 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986):
While citizens collectively as the general public have a right to know how the legal
system is functioning-so that the system can be altered and reformed-neither the
general public nor the press has a legitimate right to intrude into a long closed court
case in order to learn, publish, and sell embarrassing assertions as to the intimate
details of an individual citizen's private life, merely because the assertions and details
have been disclosed in a judicial forum in a case involving private civil litigation to
which the general public-the State-is not a party.
Id. at 1048-49.
150. Katz, 356 Pa. Super. at 471, 514 A.2d at 1379.
151. Id. (quoting Publicker Indus. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1071 (3d Cir. 1984)).
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was established in order to protect the privacy interests of individuals
engaged in often painful divorce proceedings.' 5
III. ACCESS TO SUMMARY JURY TRIALS
The lower courts have taken divergent approaches to public right of
access in civil proceedings. Often, this diversity stems from the variety
of circumstances in which the right is asserted. Because of the need
for a case-by-case analysis, a mechanistic "bright-line" rule approach
would be problematic and difficult to apply. Cincinnati Gas & Electric
Co. v. General Electric Co.' is illustrative of the problem as both the
district court and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals declined to adopt
a rigid, formalistic test.
A. The Facts
In Cincinnati Gas, the plaintiffs were three electric utility compa-
nies who had jointly undertaken the construction of the William H.
Zimmer Nuclear Power Plant. ' 4 In 1984, the plaintiffs filed suit
against the General Electric Company and Sargent & Lundy Engi-
neers, an architectural and engineering firm. The grounds for the law-
suit were breach of contract, and a common law right of action
concerning modification of the plant. The plaintiffs' amended com-
plaint also charged General Electric with fraud and RICO act viola-
tions.
Because of the confidential information that would be disclosed
during discovery, the parties negotiated a comprehensive protective
order. This order, which the magistrate approved, restricted the use
of, and reference to, certain documents the producing parties classi-
fied as "confidential" or "highly confidential." In 1987, the district
court ordered the litigants to participate in a summary jury trial, and
the court's order included a provision closing the proceeding to the
152. Id. The court stated:
Trials of divorce issues frequently involve painful recollections of a failed marriage,
details of marital indiscretions, emotional accusations, and testimony which, if pub-
lished, could serve only to embarrass and humiliate the litigants. While the public has
a right to know that its courts of justice are fairly carrying out their judicial functions,
no legitimate purpose can be served by broadcasting the intimate details of a soured
marital relationship.
Id.
153. 854 F.2d 900 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied sub nom. Cincinnati Post v. General Elec.
Co., 109 S. Ct. 1171 (1989).
154. Id. at 901.
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press and public.' 5 Subsequently, various newspapers moved to inter-
vene to challenge the order closing the summary jury trial, alleging
that the presumptive public right of access to civil trials applied
equally to summary jury trials. 15 6
B. The District Court
The district court denied the motion to intervene, finding that "the
First Amendment right of access to certain judicial proceedings does
not attach to [the] summary jury trial."'15 7 To reach this conclusion,
the court engaged in a well-reasoned analysis and application of
Justice Brennan's two-part test. 58
1. The "Tradition" Prong
The movants argued that because of the similarities between the
summary jury trial and a trial on the merits, the summary jury trial
should fall under the general civil trial category, making "General
Electric's contention that there is no 'tradition of accessibility' for
such proceedings . . . incorrect."' 5 9 Also, the movants emphasized
that the parties could stipulate that the summary jury trial verdict be
binding. However, the court rejected these arguments as "exalt[ing]
form over function."' 6 The court noted that given the short existence
of the technique, there was no historically recognized right of access
to summary jury trials.' 6 ' The court stated that the summary jury
trial, despite its outward appearance of a trial, was nonetheless a set-
tlement technique, and "while the history of the summary jury trial is
limited, there is general agreement that historically settlement tech-
niques are closed procedures rather than open.' 1 62 However, while the
court emphasized that even though the parties had not stipulated to a
binding summary jury trial verdict and that such a stipulation would
155. Id. at 901-02. In addressing the jury on the need for confidentiality, Judge Spiegel ex-
plained, "The concern among some of the parties is that if the contents or the results of your
decision became public, the prospects of the settlement might be diminished and might increase
the difficulty of selecting a jury in the future when this case comes up for trial in a couple of
months." Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 117 F.R.D. 597, 604 (S.D. Ohio
1987), aff'd, 854 F.2d 900 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied sub nom. Cincinnati Post v. General
Elec. Co., 109 S. Ct. 1171 (1989).
156. Cincinnati Gas, 117 F.R.D. at 598.
157. Id. at 602.
158. See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
159. Cincinnati Gas, 117 F.R.D. at 600.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 599.
162. Id.
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not change the "character" of the proceeding, it vacated the order
relating to the parties' option to make such a stipulation. 63
While the court agreed with the movants that the two proceedings
were similar, the court suggested two reasons why this similarity
would not be dispositive of the first prong of Brennan's test. First,
"while movants have focused on the similarities between a trial on the
merits and a summary jury trial, the differences are manifold. "164 The
court noted that the parties had only seven days to participate in a
summary jury trial, whereas the actual trial would take months. 65 Be-
cause of these time limitations, not all of the available evidence would
be presented at the summary jury trial, nor would there be live testi-
mony or cross-examination of witnesses. In addition, only selected is-
sues would be presented at the summary jury trial. The issues tried
would be only "those issues that appear to be central to any meaning-
ful settlement discussions in this case."' While the court conceded
that the jurors were selected from the community to participate in the
summary jury trial proceeding, the court distinguished the jury's func-
tion in summary proceedings from the jury's function in an actual
trial on the merits. 167 The jurors were told at the beginning of the ac-
tion that they would be participating in a dispute resolution proceed-
ing, and that their input would aid the parties in assessing the
strengths and weaknesses of the case as well as its value.' 68 The jury
would also engage in considerations directed toward settlement that
would not occur at trial, because they would assume liability and as-
sess any damages. Finally, the jury verdict would be advisory. 69 The
court's second reason stemmed from these similarities: "We readily
agree that we attempt to have the proceeding mimic trial procedures
to the degree possible, but this effort does not detract from the stated
goal of settlement-to the contrary, the realism of the procedure is
key to successful functioning." 70
2. The "Function" Prong
The newspapers also argued that access to this summary jury trial
was important in terms of the process of the proceeding, because it
163. Id. at 600-01. "However, in an abundance of caution, on our own initiative, which is
unopposed by the parties in this case, we hereby vacate paragraph 20 of our June 28 Order
relating to counsels' ability to stipulate that a consensus verdict be deemed a final determination
of the merits." Id. at 601.





169. Id. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
170. Cincinnati Gas, 117 F.R.D. at 601. See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
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''may result in the settlement of the case so that the 'sole occasion' for
public observation of the justice system's role in this type of dispute
resolution, in a case involving issues of paramount public interest con-
cerning nuclear power plants will be lost."'' 7' While the court did not
dispute that these were issues of public importance, 72 the court noted
that a similar result would always follow in a case which settles prior
to actual trial.' 73 "Thus, should this case settle, either pursuant to
more traditional settlement techniques or the summary jury trial, the
public would be precluded from hearing the actual evidence in the
case."'
74
The newspapers also argued that public access to the summary jury
trial would ensure that the proceedings were conducted fairly. 7 The
court rejected this argument, concluding that there were already suffi-
cient safeguards for fairness. The court noted that "these proceedings
are nonbinding and, other than fostering the hope of settlement, they
have no effect on the merits or outcome of the case.' 7 76 The court
stated that the jury would also act as the "inestimable safeguard"
against unfairness by constituting public participation, albeit lim-
ited. 77 Thus, instead of adopting a rigid, categorical approach, the
court focused on the underlying purposes and structure of the sum-
mary jury trial to conclude that "summary jury trials, as recognized
settlement techniques, are in a class of proceedings that have been
closed to the public to best effectuate their purposes."178
C. The Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district
court's decision, concluding that the first amendment right of access
to civil proceedings did not apply to this summary jury trial.' 79 The
171. Cincinnati Gas, 117 F.R.D. at 600.
172. Id. The court concluded:
We are in complete agreement with movants that the issues central to the merits of this
case present matters of paramount public concern. And, as an aside, we note that
were the matter one purely within the Court's discretion, we would advocate opening
the procedure to the press and public, in the belief that all parties, as well as the
public, would be well-served by an airing of the issues.
Id.
173. Id. at 601.
174. Id. "[Tihe fact that the summary jury trial is a more formal process than the traditional
settlement conference is not determinative of the existence of a First Amendment right of ac-
cess." Id.
175. Id. at 602. See supra notes 61, 76 and accompanying text.
176. Cincinnati Gas, 117 F.R.D. at 602. Seesupra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
177. Cincinnati Gas, 117 F.R.D. at 602.
178. Id.
179. Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 854 F.2d. 900 (6th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied sub nom. Cincinnati Post v. General Elec. Co., 109 S. Ct. 1171 (1989).
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Cincinnati Post argued that the district court's refusal to allow inter-
vention for the purpose of attending the proceeding was error because
"the summary jury proceeding is analogous in form and function to a
civil or criminal trial on the merits, and therefore, the first amend-
ment right of access which encompasses civil and criminal trial and
pre-trial proceedings also encompasses the summary jury proceed-
ings." Further, they argued that "public access would play a signifi-
cant positive role in the functioning of the judicial system and
summary jury trials."' 80 The Court of Appeals, however, agreed with
the appellee's arguments that settlement proceedings were not tradi-
tionally accessible, that it exalted form over function to argue that
summary jury trials were indistinguishable from actual trials, and that
public access would not significantly further the functioning of the
process.' 8
The Court of Appeals rejected the argument that summary jury
trials should be considered historically open to the public due to their
structural similarity to civil trials. 182 The court discussed the dissimi-
larities between the two procedures, focusing on the summary jury
trials' abbreviated arguments, informal verdicts, lack of witnesses and
discouragement of evidentiary objections.'1 The court concluded that
some of the evidence presented in a summary jury trial proceeding
may not be admissible in an actual trial on the merits. 184 The court
also focused on the settlement function of summary jury trials in de-
scribing the dissimilarity, particularly the mock jury's assessment of
damages even where it finds no liability. Another settlement aspect
noted by the court is the informal discussion held after the advisory
verdict is rendered. There, the parties, the court, and the jurors dis-
cuss the strengths and weaknesses of each side's case a process una-
vailable in civil trials. 85 Finally the court emphasized the nonbinding
nature of the summary jury trial, rejecting the argument that the pro-
ceeding was like an adjudication because the parties were compelled to
participate. The court noted in this regard:
180. Id. at 902.
181. Id. at 903-05.
182. Id. at 904.
183. Id. See generally notes 26-40, supra, and accompanying text.
184. Cincinnati Gas, 854 F.2d at 904. Although an argument might be made that, given the
informality of the proceedings and the emphasis on expediency, evidence in a summary jury trial
proceeding is restricted to evidence which would be admissible at trial, it is clear that some other-
wise inadmissible evidence will of necessity be introduced at a summary jury trial proceeding.
See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
185. Cincinnati Gas, 854 F.2d at 904. "At every turn the summary jury trial is designed to
facilitate pretrial settlement of the litigation, much like a settlement conference." Id.
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The district court expressly stated that the proceeding was
undertaken with the cooperation of the parties. Although the court
denied appellants' motion to vacate the order setting the summary
jury trial, it accommodated appellants' concerns to keep the
proceeding confidential, thereby making it unnecessary for
appellants to challenge the court's denial of the motion. 116
The Court of Appeals reasoned that allowing public access to sum-
mary jury trial proceedings over the parties' objections would signifi-
cantly limit the procedure's utility as a settlement device, and would
therefore undermine the government's substantial interest in promot-
ing settlement.'8 The court's understanding of the summary jury
trial's function as a settlement device led it to further conclude that
the claim of a "right to know" has "no validity with regard to sum-
mary jury trials."'' 88 The court also noted that the public would have
no entitlement to observe any negotiations leading to a traditional set-
tlement of the case, and the parties would be under no constitutional
obligation to reveal the content of the negotiations.
Finally, the court rejected the appellants' argument that summary
jury trials should be open because of the final and decisive effect on
the outcome of the litigation. 8 9 In making this argument, the appel-
lants relied on the language in Press Enterprise II which suggested that
preliminary criminal hearings must be open to the public because of
their decisive effect on criminal cases.' 90 The court determined, how-
ever, that a preliminary criminal hearing is distinguishable from a
summary jury trial because the former results in a binding judicial
determination, whereas the latter does not present matters for adjudi-
cation by the court. The lack of a binding determination is the essence
of the summary jury trial as a settlement technique, and participation
in the summary jury trial does not affect the parties' right to a full
trial de novo on the merits.1 91 "Thus, it is the presence of the exercise
of a court's coercive powers that is the touchstone of the recognized
right to access, not the presence of a procedure that might lead the
parties to voluntarily terminate the litigation." 92
186. Id. at 904-05 n.5.
187. Id. at 904. "Consistent with this rationale, courts have rejected first amendment claims
of access, even though the information involved was of undeniable public interest."
Id. at 905 n.6. The court cited Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20 (1984), in which the
Supreme Court upheld the issuance of a protective order prohibiting the public dissemination of
information obtained in pretrial discovery despite a strong public interest.
188. Cincinnati Gas, 854 F.2d at 905.
189. Id. Once again, the same could be argued with respect to any settlement negotiations.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 905 n.7.
192. Id. at 905.
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D. Analysis
One of the primary difficulties inherent in applying Justice Bren-
nan's two-prong test 93 to a summary jury trial lies in the fact that the
two prongs are inextricably intertwined. It seems to beg the question
to argue that summary jury trials have not traditionally been open to
the public due to their relatively recent origin. However, summary
jury trials-as settlement procedures-also fail the "tradition of ac-
cessibility" prong. In order to effectively negate this "tradition"
prong, one must examine the "purpose" prong as well. By examining
why access to these procedures is not important to their functioning,
one can see why they are not traditionally open to the public. This
analytic difficulty is illustrated by the district court's opinion in which
the two prongs of the test were treated as interdependent. 194
Another difficulty lies in positioning summary jury trials on a spec-
trum between actual trials and pure settlement negotiations. The
newspapers attempted to position summary jury trials immediately ad-
jacent to actual trials because of their facial similarities. 95 In contrast,
the proponents of closure argued that the summary jury trial belonged
at the opposite end of the spectrum because its purpose is to promote
settlement. 196 The district court and the court of appeals, however,
adopted a more functional, realistic approach, by discussing the dif-
ferences between the techniques and the reasons underlying those dif-
ferences. 197 By examining the abbreviated procedures, the evidentiary
flexibility, the lack of a binding adjudication, and the preservation of
the right to a full trial on the merits, both courts concluded that de-
spite its superficial similarity to an actual trial, the summary jury trial
had functional differences substantial enough to establish its primary
role as a settlement device.
Implicit in the appellate court's discussion of settlement was its ac-
ceptance of policy concerns militating against access to settlement pro-
cedures. 9 The major concern, as other courts have noted, 199 is the
strong public policy favoring the settlement of private disputes without
having to resort to litigation. As the Minnesota Supreme Court noted in
193. See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
194. See Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 117 F.R.D. 597, 599-600 (S.D.
Ohio 1987), aff'd, 854 F. 2d 900 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied sub nom. Cincinnati Post v. Gen-
eral Elec. Co., 109 S. Ct. 1171 (1989).
195. Id. at 600. See supra notes 164-70 and accompanying text.
196. Cincinnati Gas, 854 F.2d at 903.
197. See supra notes 160-70, 178, 187-90 and accompanying text.
198. See supra notes 187-88 and accompanying text.
199. See, e.g., Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Schumacher, 392 N.W.2d 197 (Minn.
1986).
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Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Schumacher, "[o]ne of the reasons
parties agree to settle is that they do not wish to go to trial and expose
their disputes to the public." 2° The court went on to conclude that the
public policy favoring settlement militated against disclosing to the pub-
lic the content of settlement documents. "Such reasoning would tend to
discourage settlements rather than [encouraging] them." 201
The same reasoning applies equally for public access to summary
jury trials. Allowing the public to scrutinize the events in a procedure
designed for settlement would defeat one of the primary purposes of
the process and add an additional barrier to settlement.
In Cincinnati Gas the court concluded that "allowing access [to sum-
mary jury trials] would undermine the substantial governmental interest
in promoting settlements." 202 This is not to say that summary jury trials
must always be closed; the final decision, according to Judge Lambros,
should be left to the discretion of the court. He notes that "judges
should have the call when ADR won't function if the process is pub-
lic." 203 Judge Lambros observed that 'if ever there were a case for
closure' of the proceedings to the public, 'the General Electric Case was
it.' ' ' 204 In its successful opposition to a motion by the newspapers to
have Judge Lambros appointed as amicus curiae, General Electric
quoted the judge as "generally favoring open SJT's, but also as favor-
ing the vesting of broad discretion in district judges 'to adapt the proce-
dure to the individual and to conduct the summary jury trial in the
manner that is most conducive to settlement.'" 205
IV. CONCLUSION
One of the principal features of our democratic form of government
is the right of the people to freely discuss the governmental process.
Unless the people can observe that governmental process at work, there
is little to discuss, and the fiercely protected freedom of speech is se-
verely undermined. However, this right is not absolute. A criminal de-
fendant's right to a fair trial may outweigh this right, and the Supreme
Court has recognized that states, in such cases, may regulate access to
200. Id. at 205.
201. Id.
202. Cincinnati Gas, 854 F.2d at 904.
203. Judges Should Have Call on Use, Closure of Proceeding, Lambros Says, 2 Alternative
Dispute Resolution Report (BNA) 251, 253 (July 21, 1988).
204. Id.
205. Press Claims Right of Access to Summary Jury Trial Record, 2 Alternative Dispute
Resolution Report (BNA) 155, 156 (Apr. 28, 1988). In fact, Judge Lambros reportedly closed
part of a summary jury trial and denied the Wall Street Journal access to the verdict, although
not the hearing, of an antitrust dispute.
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the courts.20 Also, the right of access might not extend to certain pro-
ceedings in which the participants' privacy interests are implicated.
Thus, courts have denied access to divorce hearings, 2°7 confidential
trade secrets,08 and settlement documents. 2o9 In o.'ky v. Pulsifer,2 1o
then Judge Oliver Wendell Holmes denied access to pleadings that had
never reached the court. H-c stated that "[tihese [documents] do not
constitute a proceeding in open court. Knowledge of them throws no
light upon the administration of justice.'"'2 Summary jury trials, too,
shed no light on the administration of justice because they present no
matter for adjudication by the court. They merely provide the litigants
with an effective device for facilitating settlement. The substantial gov-
ernmental interest in promoting settlements outweighs any rights of ac-
cess to a summary jury trial that the public and press may claim.
Susan Tillotson
206. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
207. See supra notes 147-52 and accompanying text.
208. See supra notes 141-46 and accompanying text.
209. See supra notes 134-40 and accompanying text.
210. 137 Mass. 392 (1884).
211. Id. at 394.
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